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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

23 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Guided Missile Exchange with the U. S. S. R.

REFERENCE: USIB-D-43.4/2

The USIB recommendation of a proposal for exchange visits with the U. S. S. R. in the field of IGY satellites has been reviewed, as requested, by appropriate agencies of the Department of Defense with attention to the security problems raised by the proposal.

The Defense agencies concerned have been asked specifically whether serious exposure of US military capability or other undesirable consequences would result if a Soviet delegation were invited to a satellite launching at Cape Canaveral, or to IGY data reduction centers, tracking stations, and production plants for IGY satellites and satellite vehicles.

The Defense agencies consider that the locations indicated can be sufficiently secured so that a Soviet delegation could be received without prejudice to the national security.

(signed)
G. B. ERSKINE
General, USMC (Ret)
Department of Defense Member
USIB

State Dept., OSD reviews completed

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- 2 -


This examination would be facilitated by a high-level study of the surprise attack threat and of the value to the United States of various possible measures to reduce that threat, including arms limitation measures which might be in our interest. Such a study should be directed by a person appointed by the President and having wide experience in this area. I believe Mr. William C. Foster should be asked to assume this responsibility. The study group under his direction would report to the group which the President has asked to coordinate future preparations in the fields of test suspension and surprise attack: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. I would anticipate that such a report could be made within ninety days.

The main burden of the study should be carried by full-time personnel. However, it would be desirable to have a panel of consultants who could at appropriate times during the study contribute their views. Mr. Foster would, of course, be assisted by a full-time staff with appropriate representation from the Departments of State and Defense, Dr. Killian's Office, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission, plus additional personnel of high competence in this field. Mr. Foster should be able to draw upon the services of the staff of the U.S. Delegation to the recent surprise attack discussions; I understand there is general agreement that this group represents an assemblage of experienced talent which would be difficult to duplicate.

Enclosed is a draft memorandum to the President which sets forth the terms of reference for the study.

Because of the urgency of moving forward with this work, I hope that you will advise me of your views as soon as possible so that the memorandum can go forward to the President.

Sincerely yours,



John Foster Dulles

Enclosure:

Draft memorandum to the President.

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23 JAN 1959

The Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I concur in the analysis contained in your letter of January 21, of the problem confronting this Government relative to a resumption of the Conference of Experts on safeguards against surprise attack. I also concur in the draft memorandum you propose sending to the President calling for a special U.S. Study Group under Mr. William C. Foster and in the terms of reference you propose for the study.

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community stand ready to render all possible support to this undertaking.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTONSECRET

January 21, 1959

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The recent Geneva Experts Conference on measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack suspended its meetings without setting a date for reconvening, although the participants, in their report to governments, expressed the hope that "discussions on the problem of preventing surprise attacks will be resumed as early as possible". However, it was the view of the Western Experts that we should not resume discussions until the governments had resolved the differences between the two sides regarding the scope and nature of the discussions. Our Delegation reports that the Western Experts also generally held the view that the West should not resume discussions with the Western side's terms of reference limited to studying methods of "inspection and observation" which might be useful in preventing surprise attack. In part because of Soviet unwillingness to engage in discussions within such a limited framework, the West would have been left with little more to say than what was presented during the first four weeks, and at the same time we would not, in fact, have been able to engage in a full military-technical analysis of the problem.

In future discussions of the surprise attack problem, we will probably have to be prepared to engage in an examination of disarmament measures which might affect the surprise attack problem, and it is possible that such discussions may not be limited to the more narrow technical aspects. Whatever the scope and the forum of the next series of meetings dealing with surprise attack, it is inevitable that the United States will have to be prepared in the near future to discuss the surprise attack problem together with, or within the context of, arms control measures. It is necessary, therefore, that we examine the problem of surprise attack in a broader framework than was used for the studies conducted prior to the recent technical conference.

This

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence.

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This document consists of 4 pages.

Number 3 of 30 copies, Series A

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Future Preparations for Surprise Attack
Safeguards Discussions

The experts conference on surprise attack safeguards suspended its meetings without setting a date for reconvening, although the joint report expressed the hope that "discussion on the problem of preventing surprise attacks will be resumed as early as possible". The Western Experts' view, however, was that we should not resume discussions until governments had resolved the differences between the two sides on the scope and nature of the talks. Our Delegation reports that the Western Experts also generally believed the West should not resume discussions with the Western side's terms of reference limited to studying methods of "inspection and observation" which might be useful against surprise attacks. The exact nature and form of future discussions will have to be worked out first with our allies and then with the Soviets.

In such future discussions we should be prepared to engage in an expert examination of disarmament measures which might affect the surprise attack problem, and it appears desirable that a future conference allow for both political and technical discussions. Prior to a future conference, therefore, it is necessary for the United States to examine the problem in a broader framework than was used for the studies prior to the recent technical conference. To facilitate this examination it is proposed that a study be undertaken of the surprise attack threat and of the value to the United States of various possible measures to reduce that threat,

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SECRET

-2-

including arms limitation measures which might be in our interest.

Such a study should be directed by a person appointed by you, and should be someone with wide experience in this area. It is proposed that Mr. William C. Foster be asked to assume this responsibility. He would report to the inter-departmental group which you have asked to coordinate future preparations in this field: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. It is anticipated that such a report could be made within ninety days.

Mr. Foster would of course have to have the services of a full time staff, with appropriate representation from the various departments and agencies.

It is further proposed that a panel of consultants be appointed by you to contribute their views at appropriate occasions during the course of the study. If you agree with this arrangement I will, once Mr. Foster has accepted the assignment, consult with him and then submit a list of names for your consideration.

Enclosed are the proposed Terms of Reference for the suggested study.

This proposal is concurred in by the members of the inter-departmental group to coordinate future preparations in this field.

John Foster Dulles

Enclosure:
Terms of Reference.

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Proposed Terms of Reference for the Study Group on
Increasing Protection Against Surprise Attack

1. The Study Group is authorized to identify the nature of the danger to the U.S. of surprise attack, at present and in the 1960s, and to present such conclusions as it may wish as to the effect of that danger on the security of the U.S., for purposes of assessing the value of various possible international agreements which, together with existing unilateral measures, might reduce the danger.
2. In this connection the Group may also evaluate the danger of the initiation of hostilities by accident or as a result of misinterpretation which tend to become more likely because of the nature and the continued development of modern weapons systems.
3. As a part of its investigation the Study Group should review and refine the technical-military studies of the U.S. Delegation to the Surprise Attack Safeguards Conference.
4. The basic objectives of the Study Group shall be to investigate and evaluate various international arrangements consistent with U.S. security interests which might reduce the danger of surprise attack or unintentional war.
5. To this end, the Study Group should:
 - (a) Determine what types of international agreements for observation and inspection would contribute most to the objective set forth in paragraph 4, and evaluate the advantages and limitations of each.
 - (b) Study various more limited first-step arrangements for observation and inspection to determine their value.
 - (c) Explore and evaluate possible international arrangements which do not involve reductions or quantitative limitations on total military forces, such as verifiable agreements relating to the deployment and operation of instruments of surprise attack, both world-wide and within particular geographical areas, which might contribute to the objectives set forth in paragraph 4.
 - (d) Examine and evaluate the contribution to the objectives in paragraph 4 of various measures of limitation and/or reduction of major instruments of surprise attack.
6. In conjunction with the above examinations, the Study Group should examine and evaluate these or other possible disarmament measures which it might be in the U.S. interest to agree to in order to obtain Soviet agreement to other arrangements which would contribute significantly to the

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-2-

objectives set forth in paragraph 4. In such an examination, consideration should be given to developments during the 1960s that may probably be required or unilaterally taken by the U.S., in the absence of international agreements, in order to determine if there are "inevitable" measures which might be usefully used as bargaining elements in negotiations with the USSR.

7. In the conduct of its work, the Study Group shall have access to all necessary military and technical data and shall receive all necessary assistance and cooperation from the departments and agencies of the Government.

8. The Chairman of the Study Group shall by April 15, 1959, report his conclusions, together with any comments which the members of the panel of consultants may wish to make, to the interdepartmental coordinating group composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

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